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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040502-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals a conviction for aggravated robbery, a first-degree felony, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Paul G. Maughan presiding. This Court has jurisdiction to 
consider the petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: May a robber who has one hand in his pocket, gesturing like he has a gun, be 
charged with aggravated robbery under Utah law? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's interpretation of a statute is reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, If 6, 63 P.3d 667. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following statutes are relevant to this appeal and reproduced in pertinent part: 
A person commits aggravated robbery if in the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (West 2004); 
"Dangerous weapon" means 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury; or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or 
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by Information dated December 9, 2003, with aggravated 
robbery, a first-degree felony, and theft of services, a class B misdemeanor. R. 6-7. The 
Information alleged that defendant robbed a downtown jewelry store on December 6, 2003. 
Defendant filed a motion to reduce the robbery charge from a first- to a second-degree 
felony. R. 38. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing and heard arguments on March 17, 
2004. R. 114. The court denied the motion by minute entry on March 29, 2004, R. 52, then 
issued a memorandum decision on April 2, 2004. R. 54-61. 
Defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to aggravated robbery on April 4, 2004, 
specifically preserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to reduce the charge. R. 73. 
On June 7,2004, defendant was sentenced to zero to 15 years in the Utah State Prison. R. 
94. 
On June 11, 2004, defendant filed a notice of appeal. R. 96. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
"Bristly" 
Other than needing a shave, defendant's appearance on the day he robbed a Gateway 
Mall jewelry store was fairly ordinary. R. 114:17 (Transcript of Motion Hearing, dated 
March 17, 2004, attached as Addendum B). 
"I noticed that he had on a thick puffy coat and he had on a beanie," recalled Jeffrey 
Reinkoester, a sales associate at the store. "I noticed that he was very bristly, didn't shave in 
a day or two, and that he was coming very determined into the store." Id. 
Reinkoester greeted defendant like any ordinary customer. 
"Hello," Reinkoester said. R. 114:9. 
Defendant's response was to the point: "I want you to go and get me all the money in 
the cash drawer right now." R. 114:9. 
"I'm not kidding," defendant added. "Hurry." R. 114:20. 
As defendant made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester with his right hand, which 
he kept concealed in the pocket of his coat. R. 114:11. 
"There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun," Reinkoester 
recalled. R. 114:11. 
"Do you want the change? " 
Reinkoester immediately moved behind the counter toward the cash register. R. 
114:20-21. Defendant tracked Reinkoester's movements and continued to point with the 
hand in his pocket. R. 114:12, 13, 21. Reinkoester opened the cash register and began 
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retrieving money. However, there was not much in the till and defendant was not pleased. 
R. 114:13. 
"Is that all you've got?" defendant asked after Reinkoester filled a bag with the cash. 
Id 
"Yes," Reinkoester said. Then he held out a roll of quarters. "Do you want the 
change?" Id. 
Defendant replied: "Fill it with jewelry." Id 
Apparently changing his mind, defendant stated, "Just give it to me." He then took the 
bag and ran to the front door. R. 114:15. 
The chase 
Nelson Fortier, the storeowner, apparently realized a robbery was in progress and 
attempted to block defendant's way. Id. 
"Don't block the fucking door," defendant said, pushing Fortier out of the way. Id.; 
R. 7. 
Fortier allowed defendant to leave, but then chased after him. R. 114:15. Once 
outside, defendant climbed into a cab, but Fortier told the driver not to leave because 
defendant had just robbed the jewelry store. R. 7. Defendant then exited the cab and ran off 
with Fortier still in pursuit. Id. Fortier finally caught up with defendant and demanded he 
return the money. Defendant complied, then ran off again, but was later arrested. Id. at 7-8. 
The motion hearing 
On March 17, 2004, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to reduce the 
aggravated robbery charge to simple robbery. R. 114. Defendant claimed that the 
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aggravated robbery charge was not proper under Utah law because he had not used or 
threatened to use a "dangerous weapon" as that term is defined in Utah law. R. 38-44. 
In opposing the motion, the State argued that the aggravated robbery statutes, when 
properly interpreted in light of Utah caselaw, covers situations in which non-verbal 
conduct—such as defendant's coat-pocket pointing gesture—constitutes a "representation" 
of a dangerous weapon, which is punishable just as if the defendant actually possessed such a 
weapon. R. 42-44. 
Reinkoester was the sole witness to testify at the hearing. His testimony was that he 
believed defendant had a gun, even though he never saw one and even though defendant did 
not verbally claim to have one: 
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do? 
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash drawer 
and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Because I thought he had a weapon. 
Q. Did he say he had a weapon? 
A. No. 
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
A. The motioning in the coat pocket. 
R. 114:13. 
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]? 
A. Fear 
5 
Q. Fear of what? 
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect. 
Q. In what way? 
A. Maybe being shot. 
R. 114:27. 
On April 2, 2004, the trial court issued a Memorandum Decision denying defendant's 
motion. R. 54-60. See Memorandum Decision, dated April 2,2004, attached as Addendum B. 
The court stated that defendant was properly charged with aggravated robbery because the coat-
pocket gesture constituted a representation of a dangerous weapon: 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce victim to believe the 
defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to perform some act based on 
the defendant's representations and then allow the defendant to benefit when it is 
later shown the defendant in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this 
case that the defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing 
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a representation. 
Therefore, the State is within its discretion in charging this matter as a first-degree 
felony. 
R. 58 (see Memorandum Decision attached as Addendum B). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant is incorrect in claiming that the trial court erred in holding that a robber 
who feigns possession of a handgun is guilty of aggravated robbery. First, under the plain 
meaning of Utah statutes defining aggravated robbery, a robber who simulates possession of 
a weapon by keeping his hand in his pocket and pointing at his victim is guilty of aggravated 
robbery. Second, Utah appellate courts have held that a robber's non-verbal conduct, such as 
defendant's coat-pocket gesture, can constitute a "representation" of a "dangerous weapon" 
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under Utah law, thus meeting the elements of aggravated robbery. Third, the majority of 
jurisdictions with analogous statutes have held that non-verbal conduct alone is sufficient to 
constitute a representation of a dangerous weapon and that a robber who makes such a 
representation may be convicted of aggravated or armed robbery. 
ARGUMENT 
L UNDER THE PLAIN MEANING OF UTAH'S STATUTES, 
DEFENDANT'S COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY WHILE 
HOLDING HIS HAND IN HIS POCKET TO "REPRESENT" A 
"DANGEROUS WEAPON" MEETS THE ELEMENTS OF 
AGGRAVATED ROBBERY. 
Defendant claims that under Utah law, he cannot be found guilty of aggravated robbery 
because he did not verbally represent that he had a gun5 Aplt. Br. at 9, even though he pointed 
toward the victim with his hand in his coat pocket in a manner that is almost universally 
recognized to indicate the presence of a gun. A plain reading of Utah statutes defining 
aggravated robbery show defendant's claim is meritless. 
In construing a statute, this Court must attempt to "'ascertain and effectuate the 
Legislature's intent.'" State v. Hunt, 906 R.2d 311, 312 (Utah 1995) (citation omitted). The 
Legislature's intent and purpose is most often evident from the plain language of the statute. Id. 
If possible, the statutory language should be given a literal meaning. State v. Ewell, 886 P.2d 
1260, 1363 (Utah App. 1993). Where the plain language of statute is clear, there is no need to 
look further. Lovendahlv. Jordan School District, 2002 UT 130, H 58, 63 P.3d 705 (Durrant, J., 
concurring and dissenting with two justices concurring); see also Okeefe v. Utah State 
Retirement Board, 956 R.2d 279, 281 (Utah 1998) (the term "overtime" is clear and 
unambiguous and the court has "no need to resort to other methods of construction"); Visitor 
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Auth. Info. Cntr. v. Customer Service Division, 930 P.2d 1196, 1198 (Utah 1997) ("Unless the 
statute on its face is unclear or ambiguous, we find no need to delve into the uncertain facts of 
legislative history55); Salt Lake Child & Family Therapy Clinic, Inc. v. Frederick, 890 P.2d 1017, 
1020 (Utah 1995) ("When language is clear and unambiguous, it must be held to mean what it 
expresses, and no room is left for construction55). A reviewing court should not add or subtract 
statutory terms. Reinkrautv. Shalala, 854 F. Supp. 838, 841 (D.Utah 1994). "Under the plain 
meaning rule, we seek the meaning of the statute from its very language, and if it is 
straightforward, we simply enforce it according to its terms. Its words then bear 'their ordinary 
meaning and the statute is not to be read so as to add or subtract from [that] which is state.. ,555 
Gardener v. Chrysler Corp., 89 F.3d 729, 736 (10th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted). 
Under Utah law, a person commits simple robbery if he or she "unlawfully and 
intentionally takes or attempts to take personal property in the possession of another from his 
person, or immediate presence, against his will, by means offeree or fear, and with a purpose or 
intent to deprive the person permanently or temporarily of the personal property; . . .55 Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (West 2004). By contrast, a person commits aggravated robbery if in 
course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous weapon 
as defined in Section 76-1-601; 
(b) causes serious bodily injury upon another; or 
(c) takes or attempts to take an operable motor 
vehicle. 
Utah Code Ann § 76-6-302 (emphasis added). "Dangerous weapon55 means: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent intended use of 
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the item leads the victim to reasonably believe 
the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury, or 
(ii) the actor represents to the victim verbally or 
in any other manner that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-601(5) (West 2004) (emphasis added). 
Thus, to be charged with aggravated robbery, a defendant must either use or threaten to 
use a "dangerous weapon," which is "any item capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury [] or a facsimile or representation of the item." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-60 l(5)(a) & (b) 
(emphasis added). According to Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2382 (1993), 
"threaten" means "to give signs of the approach of (something evil or unpleasant): indicate as 
impending: portend".1 For Reinkoester—or, indeed, any store clerk or teller faced with such a 
coat-pocket gesture—the "approaching evil" was the possibility of being shot with a "dangerous 
weapon." A "facsimile," according to Webster's, is "an exact and detailed copy of something." 
Id, at 813. For example, a toy gun or a replica of a gun would be a facsimile. There is no 
allegation that defendant used a facsimile; rather, he is accused of using a "representation" of a 
dangerous weapon. When defendant placed his hand in his pocket and pointed toward 
Reinkoester, he intentionally represented that he had a dangerous weapon, to wit: a handgun. He 
did so non-verbally by "portrayal or delineation... in a visible image or form." See Webster's at 
1926. Finally, defendant's "use or apparent intended use of the item [led] the victim to 
reasonably believe the item [was] likely to cause death or serious bodily injury;..." Utah Code 
1
 "In the case of unambiguous statutes, this court has a long history of relying on 
dictionary definitions to determine plain meaning." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 1084 11, " 2 p - 2 d 
986 (Utah 1996). 
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Ann. § 76-6-60 l(5)(b)(I). Something is "apparent" if it is "capable of easy perception^] 
readily perceptible to the senses, esp sight[;]. . . Readily manifest to the senses or mind as 
real or true and supported by credible evidence . . . " Webster's at 102. Again, such a coat-
pocket gesture has a meaning that is "readily perceptible: "I have a gun and Fm prepared to 
use it." 
Indeed, Reinkoester testified that he complied with the demands precisely because he 
believed defendant may have a gun concealed in his coat pocket and was pointing it at him while 
demanding money and jewels: 
Q. And after he said get me the money in the cash drawer, what did you do? 
A. [by Reinkoester] I said all right. I circled around and came behind the cash drawer 
and we met over there and I proceeded on getting the cash. 
Q. Why did you do that? 
A. Because I thought he had a weapon. 
Q. Did he say he had a weapon? 
A. No. 
Q. What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
A. The motioning in the coat pocket. 
R. 114:13. 
Q. Why didn't you say anything to Dominique [another store worker]? 
A. Fear 
Q. Fear of what? 
A. Fear of reprisal from the suspect. 
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Q. In what way? 
A. Maybe being shot. 
R. 114:27. 
In short, under the plain meaning of the statutes, defendant robbed the jewelry store by 
using the "representation" of a "dangerous weapon" to threaten Reinkoester and force him to 
comply with defendant's demands. Defendant is, accordingly, guilty of aggravated robbery. 
II. DEFENDANT IS GUILTY OF AGGRAVATED ROBBERY 
BECAUSE HIS NON-VERBAL CONDUCT CREATED THE 
OBJECTIVELY REASONABLE BELIEF THAT HE POSSESSED A 
DANGEROUS WEAPON, 
Defendant insists that gestures cannot convey a threat under Utah law unless 
accompanied by a verbal declaration, such as "I have a gun." Defendant claims that if a he 
could be convicted based on his non-verbal representation that he was in possession of a 
weapon, the distinction between simple and aggravated robbery would be lost because it would 
leave the aggravating factor—the presence of a dangerous weapon—up to the "'caprice of the 
victim's subjective evaluation.'" Aplt. Br. at 7 (quoting Williams v. Commonwealth, 721 
S.W.2d 710, 712 (Ky. 1986)). "The trial court in this case improperly focused on the witness's 
subjective belief rather than on the objective facts of what [defendant] did in concluding that the 
charge should not be reduced to simple robbery." Id. at 12. 
Utah law contradicts defendant's claim that non-verbal conduct is insufficient to 
communicate a threat with a dangerous weapon. In State v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277 (Utah 
App. 1995), this Court upheld the aggravated robbery conviction of a defendant who told the 
victim he had a gun, although he did not display a weapon or anything that appeared to be a 
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weapon. Id. at 277. In the opinion, this Court carefully distinguished between a "facsimile," 
which is "an exact and detailed copy," and "representation," which 
is an expansive term, and, while it can mean "a likeness, 
picture, model, or other reproduction," it can also refer to "a 
statement or account especially] made to convey. . .[an] 
impression of something with the intention of influencing . . . 
action." 
Candelario, 909 R.2d at 278 (citing Webster's Third New Int 7 Dictionary 813, 1926 (1986)) 
(emphasis added). This holding clearly states that "representation" has a variety of meanings 
including "a likeness, picture, model, or other reproduction" or "a statement." Id. Moreover, 
"such a statement can be either in the form of a verbal assertion or nonverbal action'' Id .at n.2 
(emphasis added). Thus, under the correct interpretation and application of Utah law, 
defendant's use of his finger or other artifice during the course of the robbery was "nonverbal 
action" that constituted "a statement" that defendant was armed; it was also a "likeness, model 
or other reproduction" of a gun. 
The conclusion that non-verbal action alone may constitute sufficient objective evidence 
of a threat with a dangerous weapon has been echoed in other jurisdictions with similar 
aggravated robbery statutes. For example, in People v. Taylor, 628 N.W.2d 55 (Mich. App. 
2001), defendant claimed a fatal lack of "objective" evidence to support his conviction for the 
armed robbery of a convenience store because he merely held a hand inside his jacket and pants 
while telling the cashier "This is a stick up" and "Open the [cash] drawer." Id. at 58. In 
Michigan, armed robbery is committed when the robber is "armed with a dangerous weapon, or 
any article used or fashioned in a manner to lead the person so assaulted to reasonably believe it 
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to be a dangerous weapon . . . " Id. at 57 (citing Mich. Stat. Ann. § 28.797). In affirming that 
defendant committed armed robbery by placing his hand in his jacket and pants, the court stated: 
While this portion of the armed robbery statute focuses on the belief of the victim 
that the defendant was armed, that belief must be reasonable and our courts have 
long recognized that the victim's subjective belief alone is insufficient to support 
a conviction of armed robbery Therefore, the prosecutor must submit "some 
objective evidence of the existence of a weapon or article" to the finder of fact. 
Id. at 59 (citation omitted; emphasis in original). The court found the evidence against the 
defendant 
went well beyond a mere subjective belief that defendant was armed during the 
robbery. Rather, there was ample objective evidence that defendant either had a 
gun or simulated one so as to deliberately lead complainant to "reasonably 
believe" he had a gun. Complainant testified that, during the robbery, defendant 
placed his hand inside his jacket and into the front of his pants. Objectively, 
defendant could have carried a weapon under his jacket and in his waistband. 
Id. at 61. 
The court also explicitly rejected the defendant's contention that a gesture simulating the 
presence of a weapon must be backed up by some kind of verbal statement. 
[W]e decline to hold that a defendant must verbally threaten the victim with some 
specific bodily harm in order to obtain a conviction of armed robbery. If there is 
sufficient evidence that, during the course of the robbery, the defendant simulates 
a weapon so as to induce the victim to reasonably believe he is armed and, by 
word or conduct, threatens the victim by announcing a robbery or otherwise 
suggesting the potential use of the weapon, then the defendant may be convicted 
of armed robbery. 
Id. 
This view is consistent with the majority of jurisdictions that have considered the issue. 
See, e.g., Lynn Considine Cobb, Annotation, Robbery by Means of Toy or Simulated Gun or 
Pistol, 81 A.L.R.3d 1006. For example, mFaulkner v. State, 581 S.E.2d 365 (Ga. App. 2003), 
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the defendant entered a tanning salon with a white sock covering his hand. As he approached 
the cash register, an employee saw that the sock concealed something shaped like a gun. 
Defendant pressed the sock into the employee's back and told her to open the register. The 
employee testified that something in the sock "felt like .. .a gun/5 that she believed it was a gun 
and that she was afraid. Id. at 366-67. Defendant was convicted of armed robbery—the taking of 
property of another from the person or the immediate presence of another "by use of an 
offensive weapon, or any replica, article, or device having the appearance of such weapon."/d at 
367. The defendant claimed the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction for armed 
robbery because there was no evidence of a weapon and no evidence that the victim's 
apprehension was reasonable. Id. The appellate court disagreed, noting that although the 
defendant "may not have displayed a gun to the tanning salon employee, the evidence authorized 
a finding that he used an article that had the appearance of a gun to persuade her to comply with 
his demand and that his acts created a reasonable apprehension on her part that he was 
threatening her with a gun." Id. 
In State v. Arena, 663 A.2d 972, 978 (Conn. 1995), the court considered whether a 
defendant convicted of armed robbery was entitled to a lesser-included-offense instruction 
because an object concealed in a plastic bag could have been something other than a gun. In 
Connecticut, a defendant commits armed robbery if, in the course of the robbery, he "displays or 
threatens the use of what he represents by his words or conduct to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, 
shotgun, machine gun or other firearm .. ." Id. at 973, n.l. (citing Conn. Gen Stat. § 53a-134. 
Witnesses testified that the defendant approached a checkout counter and stated, "Put all the 
money in a bag." At the same time, the defendant placed an opaque plastic shopping bag on the 
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counter and pointed it at the checker. The bag contained an object that was cylindrical and about 
16 inches long, which the checker testified looked like a gun. Id. at 974. The defendant 
requested a lesser-included-offense instruction based on testimony from one witness who, on 
cross-examination, agreed that the object inside the bag could have been a club. Id. at 978. The 
trial court denied the defendant's request for a lesser-included-offense instruction and the 
Connecticut Supreme Court agreed. "The state only had to prove that the defendant represented 
by his conduct that he had a firearm. The actual contents of the bag are irrelevant. There is no 
evidence that the defendant represented by his words or conduct that he had something other 
than a firearm." Id. (emphasis in original). 
InPeople v. Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443 (N.Y. App. 1987), defendant approached the victim 
and stated, "[T]his is a stick up, give me your radio." At the same time, defendant placed his 
hand inside his vest pocket, "as if he had a gun." Id. at 443. The victim, believing defendant had 
a gun, turned over his radio. Id. Defendant was tried and convicted of two counts of robbery, 
one involving the use of a weapon. Id. at 443; see also N.Y. Penal Law § 160.15 (McKinney's) 
(armed robbery occurs when defendant "[u]ses or threatens the immediate use of a dangerous 
instrument; or . . . [djisplays what appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun 
or other firearm.. ."). However, the trial court dismissed the weapon-related count on motion 
from defendant because, even though defendant placed his hand in his vest, "his hand never 
formed the shape of any object." Id. The New York appellate court reversed, noting that "there 
is no requirement that the object need be anything other than the defendant's hand." Id. at 443-
44. "Where an unarmed robber holds his hand in his pocket so as to give the impression that he 
is holding a gun, he has '[d]isplay[ed] what appears to be . . . a firearm' within the meaning of 
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the statute.' Id. at 444. 
In State v. Ellison, 819 P.2d 1010 (Ariz. App. 1991), the court held that defendant and an 
accomplice were guilty of armed robbery because they were either "armed with a 
deadly weapon or a simulated deadly weapon" or "use[d] or threatened] to use a deadly 
weapon or dangerous instrument or a simulated deadly weapon." Id. at 1012 (citing Arizona 
Revised Statues § 13- 1904(A)). "They committed the robberies by positioning their hands to 
make their hands appear as if they instead were deadly weapons." Id. at 1013. 
The foregoing authority demonstrates that the vast majority of jurisdictions interpreting 
statutory language similar to Utah's have found that non-verbal communication, including the 
unequivocal gestures indicating the presence of a gun, are sufficient to establish armed or 
aggravated robbery. These cases show that the trial court's decision is consistent with Utah 
precedent and with the law in many if not most of the jurisdictions in the country. The trial 
court's decision and defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
III. VICTIMS SHOULD NOT BE REQUIRED TO VERIFY THAT A 
WOULD-BE ROBBER IS ACTUALLY IN POSSESSION OF A 
WEAPON. 
In rejecting defendant's motion to reduce the charges against him from aggravated 
robbery to simple robbery, the trial court made an important observation: "[I]t is not fair, 
reasonable or wise to place the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in 
the defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon." R. 58 (Memorandum Decision, Addendum 
B). 
Other courts have voiced similar concerns about placing the onus on the victim to 
challenge the robber to prove that he actually possess a weapon. For example, m Aaron v. Kelly, 
16 
65 F. Supp.2d 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court held that the defendant was properly convicted 
under a New York statute that enhanced the crime of robbery if the robber "[displays what 
appears to be a pistol, revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun or other firearm. . ." Id. at 185 
(citing N.Y.Penal Law § 160.10(2)(b)). The defendant was convicted of sneaking into a dorm 
house and robbing two students. While fleeing from one of the students, the defendant put his 
hand in his pocket and, in a "threatening manner," told the student chasing him to be quiet. Id. 
at 184. In rejecting the defendant's claim this his gesture alone was insufficient under the 
statute, the court noted that New York caselaw had long held that that"' display of anything that 
appears to be [a firearm], though held inside a coat or otherwise obscured, is covered' by the 
law," thus elevating the level of offense for displaying what appears to be a firearm. Id. at 187. 
The court also stated that even if the student who pursued the defendant 
was in fact uncertain as to whether [defendant] had a gun or a knife, that would 
not affect the propriety of his conviction under New York law. "A robbery victim 
is not, in our view, required to call a robber's bluff, in order to allay any lingering 
uncertainty, before the armed offense is made out." 
Id. at 187 (citing People v. Bynum, 125 A.D.2d 207, 209, 509 N.Y.S.2d 321, 323 (1st Dep't 
1986), affd, 70 N.Y.2d 858, 523 N.Y.S.2d 492, 518 N.E.2d 4 (1987)). 
The dangers of requiring a robbery victim to confirm that the hand or bulge in the 
robber's pocket is an actual weapon are apparent. It is inevitable that the clerk who is required 
to verify the existence of a weapon will end up injured or worse when it turns out that the robber 
has a real weapon. This Court should not adopt a policy that encourages such potentially 
disastrous confrontations. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this JT%y of December, 2004 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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Salt Lake City, Utah; Wednesday, March 17, 2004; a.m. 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning. State of Utah versus 
William Joseph Ireland, case ending 8349. 
Counsel, will you make your appearances for the 
record. 
MR. PETERSON: Mike Peterson representing 
Mr. Ireland, who is present. 
MR. BOWN: Greg Bown appearing for the State. 
THE COURT: And Mr. Ireland is with us? 
MR. PETERSON: He is. 
Your Honor, during the course of this hearing I'm 
wondering if I could ask the Court to allow the unshackling of 
his writing hand so he can assist me. 
THE COURT: We'll leave him shackled. 
How many witnesses will you have? 
MR. BOWN: I have two, your Honor, but one has not 
shown up. But I do have Andrew Reinkoester, who is here, my 
only witness. 
THE COURT: Do you want to have him come up and be 
sworn. 
THE CLERK: You do solemnly swear to tell the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God. 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Before you begin, Mr. Peterson, my 
4 
understanding is this matter was set for jury trial, the trial 
has been cancelled and the sole issue today is whether or not 
Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first-degree felony or a 
second-degree felony. 
MR. BOWN: Yes, your Honor. The exact issue is the 
use of a dangerous weapon during the course of committing a 
robbery. 
THE COURT: Can you establish this and go forward 
with just one witness? 
MR. BOWN: I believe so, your Honor. 
THE COURT: All right. You may proceed. 
ANDREW REINKDESTER 
called as a witness in behalf of the State, having 
first been duly sworn, was examined and testified as 
follows: 
DIRECT EXAMDQATICN 
BY MR. BOWN: 
Q Will you state your name, please. 
A Andrew Jeffrey Reinkoester. 
Q Please spell your last name. 
A R-E-I-N-K-O-E-S-T-E-R. 
Q Calling your attention to December 6th of 2003, were 
you working on that day? 
A Yes. 
Q Where did you work? 
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A At Fortier Jewelers. 
Q Where is that located? 
A That is at the northern end of Gateway Mall complex. 
Q 11 South Rio Grand? 
A Yes. 
Q Was that in Salt Lake County? 
A Yes. 
Q And what do you do there? 
A I am a sales associate for the store. 
Q On December 16th, in the afternoon, did anything 
unusual happen? 
MR. PETERSON: Excuse me. It's December 6th. 
MR. BOWN: Excuse me. What did I say? 
MR. PETERSON: The 16th. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) December the 6th. 
A Yes. We were robbed. 
Q About what time did this occur? 
A Between four and five o'clock. 
Q Describe what you saw the person -- did the person 
rob you? 
A Yes. 
Q This person who robbed you, where was this person 
when you very first saw this person? 
A Outside the store, coming towards the store. 
MR. BOWN: Okay. I think it might be helpful, your 
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Honor, as we develop testimony, that he do a diagram of the 
interior of the store so we can have some idea of what he's 
doing. 
THE COURT: You may. If you want to pull that board 
out, you can write on it, the drawing board. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) Now, what I would like you to 
do, Mr. Reinkoester, is do a diagram of the interior of Fortier 
Jewelry, and if you can keep it up high, that allows everybody 
to see where it was. And it's a blue marker to begin with, and 
just do the interior, not where everybody was, just the 
interior. 
A Okay. 
Q Could you draw the exterior walls as well? 
A Sure. 
Q Okay. Now, why don't you step just to this side, if 
you would, and describe what it is that you have drawn. 
A Okay. This is the entrance to the store, and these 
represent jewelry cases right here, here, and here. And this 
is the front desk. 
Q Okay. Now, for the record, the first indication that 
you had that you made was the --at the top of the diagram 
there is a broken --a line that is --
A Broken. 
Q -- broken. 
A Yes. 
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Q That is the door? 
A That is the door. 
Q Does it swing inside or outside? 
A It does both. 
Q Looks like elbows/ elbow-shaped boxes, three of them. 
Those are what? 
A Those are the jewelry cases. 
Q And there are spaces between those, right? 
A Right. 
Q What's there? 
A Like here? That's just a walkway to the center of 
store. 
Q Then there's a rectangular box. What is that? 
A That is the front desk. 
Q Okay. Where is the money for that store kept in 
Fortier Jewelry? 
A In the front desk. 
Q Is it in the drawer? 
A Yeah. 
Q Please indicate that. 
A Sure. 
Q Where that would be. 
A Drawer right here. 
Q Okay. Now, where were you -- let me give you a red 
pen, if I could, to decide where people are. 
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In red and with a red pen indicate where you were 
when you first saw the person who came in? 
A I am right here. 
Q Put an 'X1, red 'X' there. From the front the part 
of the store, I guess it would be on the north end? 
A Right. 
Q And where was the person who robbed you when you 
first saw him? 
A First saw him? 
Q Yes. Just outside the door, is that correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Okay. What happened after you first saw this person? 
A He came into the store. I greeted him. I said 
hello. And he said I want you to go and get me all the money 
in the cash drawer right now. 
Q Where was this person when he said that? Put a 
number one there, if you would. 
A Sure. Right here. 
Q Do you recognize the person, that said those things 
to you, in the courtroom today? 
A Yes, I do. 
Q Would you point to that person and describe what that 
person is wearing today. 
A It is the defendant in the yellow jumpsuit. 
MR. BOWN: Let the record reflect the identification 
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of the defendant. 
THE COURT: The record will so reflect. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) Tell me -- we'll get into some 
other details later, but showing movement, after that was 
stated to you, what did you do? 
A After that was stated, I circled around at his 
request and came to the cash drawer. 
Q So in the counter-clockwise way you went around the 
outside of the store? 
A Yes, around the periphery. 
Q Okay. Where did the defendant go while you were 
doing that? 
A He circled right here. 
Q Why don't you close that up and take the witness 
seat. 
When you first saw -- when you saw the defendant 
inside the store, how was the defendant dressed? 
A The defendant was wearing a very large coat, thick 
coat --it was brown -- and a beanie cap. 
Q Do you know what kind of pants he had on? 
A No. 
Q Was he doing anything -- let me ask you this. Did 
you see his hands? 
A I only recall -- I did not see his hands, no. 
Q Okay. And that's a bare hand that I'm talking about. 
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A Right. 
Q Did you see where his hands were? 
A Yes. There was one hand in a pocket, gesturing like 
there was a gun. 
Q This coat is what kind of a coat? 
A It's -- if I recall correctly it was a very thick --
thick brown coat. 
Q Wool? Parka? Do you recall? 
A Maybe down, if I remember correctly. 
Q Kind of puffy? 
A Yes. 
Q Would you stand, please, and indicate how you saw the 
defendant's hand in his pocket? 
A Like my own pockets? 
Q No, just best you can. 
A About like this. 
Q You have it against your body? 
A Um-hum. 
Q Towards -- if I were you --
A Yes. 
Q --it would be pointing at me? 
A Yeah. 
Q What did he say -- let me ask you this. Was that the 
first thing you saw or heard? 
A Yeah. The first thing I said was hello, and the 
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first thing I heard, the response was give me all the cash in 
the cash drawer. 
Q When, in relationship to that, get me all the cash in 
the cash drawer, was the hand in like this? 
A The whole time. 
Q So he started out that way? 
A Started out that way. 
Q Did you move at all? 
A No. 
Q Move back and forth? 
A No. I said okay, and I went over there. 
Q Now, you had your hand kind of tucked in? 
A Right. 
Q Your arm kind of tucked back a little bit; is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q So it was not pointing out far? 
A No, no. It was definitely gesturing like there was a 
weapon, but it was more subtle. Didn't say -- something like 
this, because there was a lot of other people in the store. 
Q Let me ask you this. Who else was in the store? 
A Myself, Cherie. 
Q Besides yourself. 
A Cherie, Nelson, Dominique! Warren, and two customers. 
Q Nelson, who's that? 
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A He's the owner of the store. 
Q And after he said get me the money in the cash 
drawer, what did you do? 
A I said all right. I circled around and came behind 
the cash drawer and we met over there and I proceeded on 
getting the cash. 
Q Why did you do that? 
A Because I thought he had a weapon. 
Q Did he ever say he had a weapon? 
A No. 
Q What was it that led you to believe he had a weapon? 
A The motioning in the coat pocket. 
Q When you got over to the desk, what happened there? 
A I proceeded to start getting the cash out. I 
thought --we didn't have a lot of cash. I fumbled around with 
bags for a little while. I started with clear bags and then 
grabbed a darker bag and put that in. And he said, "Is that 
all you've got?" And I was like, "Yes." And then I held out 
like a roll of quarters and said, "Do you want the change?" 
And he said, "Fill it with jewelry." 
Q While he's standing there, how far in front of the 
desk is he? 
A He's right up against the desk. 
Q Like I am to this podium? 
A Yes. 
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Q How high is the desk where he is standing? 
A It's probably about somewhere in here. 
Q You're indicating mid chest? 
A Yeah. Standing about like this. 
Q Your mid chest? 
A Yes. 
Q Where did it hit? Where did the top hit the 
defendant? 
A Probably a little bit higher. I don't recall 
exactly. 
Q At that point did you see the hand that he had in the 
coat? 
A No. 
Q Why is that? 
A Just the desk was too high. 
Q What happened after you gave him the bag with the 
money? Let me ask you this. 
We got to the point where he said put some jewelry 
in --
A Yes. 
Q What happened at that point? 
A At that time Nelson noticed something was wrong over 
at the front desk and exited the store. And at that point I 
think he noticed --
MR. PETERSON: I object. Speculation as to what 
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Nelson noticed. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) Tell me what you saw Nelson do. 
A I saw Nelson exit the store. And he said, "Just give 
it to me," and I gave it to him and he ran to the front door. 
Q At any of that time -- was the defendant looking at 
you all the time? Or did he look anywhere else? 
A I can't recall. 
Q What happened after you gave him the bag? 
A He went to the front door and Nelson was on the other 
side, kind of blocking him. And he said, "Don't block the 
fucking door." And he pushed, and Nelson finally gave and he 
ran out and Nelson chased him. 
Q Do you recall whether at that time he took his hand 
out of the pocket? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you ever recall what was going on with his left 
hand during the entire time? 
A Other than taking the bag with the money -- I can't 
remember. 
Q So he took the bag of money with his left hand? 
A I can't remember. 
Q Did you ever see his right hand outside of the coat? 
A I can't remember. 
Q Okay. What happened after the defendant made it out 
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the door? What did you see? 
A I saw him take off running and I saw Nelson chasing 
him. 
Q Did you go out yourself and --
A I did not. 
Q Did you know whether or not the defendant had a gun? 
A Concretely no, but I assumed so. 
Q Based on what? 
A Based on the gesturing in the pocket. 
MR. BOWN: Just a moment, your Honor. 
I have no further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Peterson. 
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
CROSS-EXaMINi^TiaN 
BY MR. EETERSCN: 
Q Andrew, when you were located where you indicated on 
the diagram with the red 'X1 --
A Sure. 
Q -- I take it you could see from this position through 
a glass door to the outside? 
A Yes. 
Q And how long did you observe my client outside the 
door? 
A Probably about two seconds, walking, starting toward 
the glass door. 
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Q Okay. What did you observe physically about my 
client as he walked toward the door? 
A Like in description of what he looked like? 
Q Um-hum. 
A Okay. I noticed that he had on the thick puffy coat 
and he had on a beanie. I noticed that he was very bristly, 
didn't shave in a day or two, and that he was coming very 
determined into the store. 
Q When you say "very determined," was he walking? 
A Yes. 
Q So your sense is there was a man walking toward the 
store, he's coming in the store? 
A Yes. 
Q Naturally, to get in the store he has to open the 
door manually; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Are you watching him as he comes in the door? 
A Yes, I am. 
Q Okay. So does Mr. Ireland reach out and open the 
door with his hand? 
A I do not remember. 
Q What do you remember about him opening the door? 
A Not much. I don't remember even if he opened it 
towards me or towards himself. 
Q Okay. All right. As he's walking toward the store 
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from the outside do you recall whether his hands are to the 
side swinging freely? 
A No, I don't recall. 
Q Do you recall anything about his hands as he's 
walking towards the store? 
A I do not. 
Q Do you recall whether you see Mr. Ireland carrying 
anything as he comes toward the store? 
A Oh, like a bag? 
Q Or anything. 
A I didn't see him carrying anything. 
Q At any time, from the time Mr. Ireland comes into the 
Fortier store until he exits and runs away, did you see him 
carrying anything other than the bag you handed him? 
A No. 
Q When Mr. Ireland approached you, I take it that he 
walked directly to where you indicated with a number one? 
A Yes. 
Q And at that point you say how's it going? 
A Basically, yeah. Hello. 
Q And his response is hi, how are you? Or what's his 
response? 
A His response is I want you to go over to the cash 
drawer and get me the money. 
Q So there are no pleasantries. He just goes right to 
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the money? 
A Correct. 
Q Okay. We're in December when this happens, right? 
A Right. 
Q And December down at the Gateway is wintertime? 
A Yes. 
Q It's cold outside? 
A Yes. 
Q People wear coats? 
A Um-hum. 
Q Not infrequently people will maybe have hands inside 
a coat when they come in? 
A Sure. 
Q The exterior that we're talking about here, from the 
outside of the store to the inside, is all outdoors; right? 
A Right. 
Q So you have had customers come into Fortier Jewelry 
before in the wintertime with their hands inside a coat, 
correct? 
A Sure. 
Q Now, let's break down for Judge Maughn everything 
that my client says. 
A Okay. 
Q So when he's at position number one, that's when he 
demands money. 
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A 
Q 
point * 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes. 1 
Does he say anything else while you are standing at 
X1 and he's at point one? 
He says, "I'm not kidding. Hurry." 
How do you respond? 
Mostly with a gesture. Like that. 
Okay. So you kind of shrug your shoulders? 1 
Yes. 
Acknowledging that he demanded money? 
Yes. 
Does he say anything else while he's standing at 
point one? 
A 
Q 
around 
A 
Q 
No. 
Is it after he said that that you begin to walk 
the perimeter to the desk? 
Yes. 
By the way, what prevents you from walking out the 
front door? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
jewelry 
A 
"Excuse 
Walking out the front door? 
Yes. 
No. 
Do you say anything to anybody as you walk from the 1 
case at point 'X' around the other case to the desk? 1 
I had to pass behind Dominique and I think I said, 
me, Dominique." 1 
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Q Okay, Did you say anything else to anyone else? 
A No. 
Q As you're walking toward the desk? 
A No. 
Q What movement does Mr. Ireland do then when you walk 
around the case to the desk? 
A He just kind of comes and tracks me and comes to the 
desk. 
Q So he walks across the display room floor? 
A Um-hum. 
Q Essentially in a straight line? 
A Not exactly. More like kind of a half moon. 
Q Okay. Keeping a certain distance. As he's walking 
in this half moon, what did you observe about my client. 
A Not much. I was not actually looking at the client 
at that point. I was looking strictly at the cash drawer. 
Q While you're walking toward the desk do you hear my 
client say anything? 
A No. 
Q Do you hear him talk to anybody else, while he's in 
the store, besides you? 
A No. 
Q You get to the desk where the cash is, and where is 
my client at that time? 
A At the front of the desk. 
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Q Okay, And at that point you don't know whether he 
has his hands outside his pockets or not, right? 
A Correct, 
Q He's not holding his hand in the pocket and gesturing 
the pocket up toward you any longer, correct? 
A Correct, 
Q What, if anything, does Mr. Ireland say while he's at 
the desk where you're getting the cash? 
A Okay. Get the money together and give it to him. 
And he says, "Is this all?" And I said, "Want the change?" 
And he's like, "Fill it with jewelry." That's it. 
Q At any time while you're getting the cash, putting it 
in the bag, does Mr. Ireland make any physical gestures toward 
you? 
A No. 
Q Is there anything else that Mr. Ireland says while 
he's at that desk? 
A After Nelson left the store, "Just give it to me." 
Q "Just give it to me," referring to --
A To the bag. 
Q To the bag. All right. Now, you've indicated, in 
answering some questions from Mr, Bown, that you felt like 
there might be something in Mr, Ireland's coat pocket other 
than a hand; right? 
A Yes, um-hum. 
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Q The sole reason you say that is because he lifted his 
hand inside the pocket when he first encountered you where 
youfre marked at point 'X1? 
A Um-hum. 
Q Yes? 
A Yes. 
Q Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about 
possessing a weapon, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q Mr. Ireland never says anything to you about harming 
you with a weapon, correct? 
A Correct. 
Q And Mr. Ireland never makes any statements alluding 
to the possibility of shooting? 
A Correct. 
Q Or of cutting you? 
A Correct. 
Q You said to Mr. Bown your apprehension was maybe he 
had a gun, right? 
A Yes, um-hum. 
Q Obviously, that's speculation on your part; right? 
A Sure, yes. 
Q Why do you speculate that he had a gun as opposed to 
perhaps a knife? 
A There is no reason other than that's just what my 
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mind jumped to when I saw the bulge in the 
me. 
Q 
what•s in 
A 
Q 
And you never said anything to 
the pocket? 
No. 
So the bottom line, Andrew, is 
pocket, pointed at 
Mr. Ireland about 
you don't 
idea whether he had a weapon in his pocket 
A 
be marked 
* 
witness? 
document, 
Concretely, no. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, could 
, please, as Defense No. 1? 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
was introduced.) 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, may 
THE COURT: You may. 
Q (BY MR. PETERSON) And I 
which is two-sided, now marked 
No. 1. Do you recognize that? 
A 
Q 
A 
robbery. 
Q 
A 
Q 
Yes, I do. 
What is that? 
I 
m 
or not; 
have any 
do you? 
I ask that an item 
approach the 1 
showing you a 1 
as Defendant's Exhibit 
That's the statement I filled out on the 
And did the detective ask you to 
Yes. 
You filled this out, obviously! 
night of the 
fill that out? 
close in time to when 
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this robbery occurred; correct? 
A Correct. 
Q So that was fresh in your mind at that point, is that 
correct? 
A Yes. 
Q Let me ask you to read through blocks one, two, and 
three on the first page there. 
A Okay. Out loud? 
Q No. Just to yourself. 
A All right. Okay. 
Q Andrew, do you see anywhere in blocks one, two, or 
three where you filled out in your police statement any 
indication that my client had his hand in his pocket? 
A No. 
Q Do you see anywhere in that statement to the police 
where you stated anything about feeling that my client had a 
weapon? 
A No. 
MR. PETERSON: If I may have just one moment, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: Yes, you may. 
(Mr. Peterson and the defendant confer.) 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, may I retrieve the 
statement for Mr. Bown? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. PETERSON: After Mr. Bown is through questioning 
here, your Honor, I'll move admission of Defendant's Exhibit 
No. 1, for the court's perusal. 
THE COURT: Any objection? 
MR. BOWN: I don't, your Honor. 
THE COURT: It will be received. 
(Defendant's Exhibit No. 1 
was received into evidence.) 
MR. BOWN: If I may approach the witness. 
REDIRECT EXAM3mTI0N 
BY MR. BOWN: 
Q Let me show you the reverse side of Defendant's 
Exhibit 1. There's some what? Illustrations of weapons? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you, in there, write anything? 
A Yes, I did. 
Q Okay. What did you say in addition to the 
description? 
A In block seven? 
Q Block seven. 
A Block seven, additional description, weapon in pocket 
if there was one. 
Q So you did describe you thought there was a weapon. 
A Yes. 
Q Now, Mr. Peterson said that you speculated there was 
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a gun. Now, speculation is when there is no basis for it. Did 
you have a basis for believing that there was a gun? 
A Yes. 
Q What was that? 
A Bulge in his pocket, the way it looked, pointed at 
me. 
Q Gesturing? 
A Yeah. 
Q As you were first approached and you were walking 
around to the desk, why didn't you walk out the front door? 
A It did not occur to me. What was going on in my mind 
was there's a guy who wants money and he may have a weapon. So 
I just was compliant. 
Q Why didn't you say anything about a robbery to 
Dominique? 
A Fear. 
Q Fear of what? 
A Fear of reprisal from the suspect. 
Q In what way? 
A Maybe being shot. 
Q When the defendant was in front of the desk where the 
money was, was he gesturing with his hand in his coat pocket? 
A At the desk I could not see his -- that part of his 
coat anymore. 
Q So you don't know if he was or was not? 
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A I don't know. 
Q Is there any question in your mind that the defendant 
apparently intended to make you believe he had a gun? 
A No, there is no question. 
THE COURT: Would you repeat. I'm not sure I got the 
last part. 
MR. BOWN: Is there any question in your mind that 
the defendant apparently intended to make you believe he had a 
gun? 
MR. PETERSON: Well, I object. That calls for wild 
speculation. 
THE COURT: He already answered that. I was just 
asking for clarification. If he believed, he can believe 
whatever he wants. 
MR. PETERSON: Mr. Bown's asking did you believe 
Mr. Ireland believed something. 
THE COURT: No, that's not true. 
Q (BY MR. BOWN) It's -- is there any question in 
your mind that the defendant apparently intended to make you 
believe he had a gun? 
A No. 
MR. PETERSON: That calls for the witness to define 
what my client intended. 
MR. BOWN: No. There is an apparent intention, which 
is what the statute requires. 
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THE COURT: I'm going to overrule the objection, but 
you're certainly free to cross-examine him. 
MR. BOWN: I have no further questions. 
RECROSS EXAMINATION 
BY MR. EETERSCN: 
Q Andrew, on the flip side of your witness report, 
which is marked as Defendant's Exhibit 1, which has now been 
admitted, when you comment about weapon in pocket, you say, "if 
there was one"; right? 
A Right. 
Q So to that extent there's speculation or guesswork at 
play about whether there was a weapon or not? 
A Right. 
MR. PETERSON: That's all I have. 
MR. BOWN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: Mr. Reinkoester, thank you for being 
here. Would you hand me the exhibit, please, and then you're 
free to leave. 
Anything further? 
MR. BOWN: That's all the witnesses I can find. 
THE COURT: Do you want to look in the hall? 
MR. BOWN: If I may. 
He is not there, your Honor, so we have no further 
evidence at this time. 
THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, do you intend to have any 
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evidence at all? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we do not. I have advised 
Mr. Ireland, of course, he has the right to testify here and it 
is my advice for him that you not submit to testimony here 
today. 
Do you intend to follow that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Sure. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, we don't have additional 
witnesses to offer. Basically this is an 
eyewitness-observation issue relative to the elements in the 
statute, and so we're prepared to submit on the evidence and 
then move to the argument portion of the motion. 
THE COURT: Mr. Peterson, it's your motion. Do you 
want to begin? 
MR. PETERSON: Yes. Thank you very much, Judge. 
Your Honor, you've had a chance to review, I hope, a 
courtesy copy of our memorandum that I submitted last week? 
THE COURT: I have. 
MR. PETERSON: And in this memorandum I cite the 
Court to basically four separate cases out of this jurisdiction 
that deal roughly with this issue, beginning with the 
requirement in Suniville that there be some kind of an actual 
showing of a facsimile. Of course, the rationale of the 
Supreme Court in that opinion was if we don't have something 
realistic looking, then we really are eroding the distinction 
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between a first and second-degree robbery. And I understand 
that since Suniville was handed down the legislature has 
amended the language with regard to the aggravated-robbery 
statute in defining dangerous weapon to include 
representations. 
The reason I cite the Court to the Adams opinion/ 
the Hartman opinion, and the other opinion inside of -- the 
Candelario opinion is to suggest to the Court that appellate 
courts have taken a close look at this representation language, 
and although not explicitly readopting the Suniville standard 
have said that there needs to be something fairly direct, 
fairly poignant with regard to that representation in order for 
there to be a distinction with regard to the use or represented 
use of a weapon versus fear or force of fear, which is the 
element in a second-degree robbery. 
I would submit that the Adams, Hartman and 
Candelario cases are all maintaining that the substantial step 
has to at least be: I have a weapon. I'm going to blast you. 
Ifm going to shoot you. I'm going to cut you. Something to 
indicate to a victim that if there is a concealed hand, which 
there was in at least one of these cases, that there be some 
form of verbal representation that gives reasonable 
apprehension to the victim that there is imminent danger from 
the use of a weapon. 
In the present case, Judge, our argument is we don!t 
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have the imminency present here. I understand --
THE COURT: Let me ask you this question. 
MR. PETERSON: Sure. 
THE COURT: What if you had the same testimony that 
was just elicited on the stand, and the defendant left -- was 
apprehended as he subsequently was and he had a revolver in his 
right-hand pocket. Would he be guilty of a first degree or a 
second degree? 
MR. PETERSON: My position is no. 
THE COURT: No. It has to be one or the other. 
MR. PETERSON: I'm sorry. I thought your question 
was would he be guilty of a first degree. 
He would be guilty of a second degree, in my 
opinion, because it's the apprehension at the time that the 
robbery is occurring that's critical as opposed to the 
after-developed discovery and fact that there was an actual 
robbery. 
THE COURT: Well, what about the witness's 
apprehension? His testimony was I was afraid I'd get shot or 
cut if I didn't. 
MR. PETERSON: Actually, his testimony was I was 
afraid I would get shot, not cut. 
THE COURT: I agree he didn't say cut, but he thought 
it was a weapon. A gun versus a knife. But my point is he 
thought he would be injured. 
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MR. PETERSON: Right. And I understand that he has 
testified to that, Judge, but under cross-examination, as we 
develop the testimony, he said, well, yeah, I -- that was 
guesswork. That was speculation. It was my speculation. 
Which of course he's entitled to whatever apprehension he's 
entitled to. 
But what I'm suggesting is when we're drawing a 
distinction between a first degree and second degree, under a 
Suniville type of analysis, it's not just the subjective belief 
of the victim that is critical. There's a certain objectivity 
and objective legal standard that enters into play. Otherwise, 
we would simply erode the distinction between a first and a 
second and leave it totally up to the subjective apprehension 
of the victim. 
What I'm suggesting to the court is the Suniville 
case and other cases that have followed since the legislative 
amendment impose a certain objective element such that the 
court in the, you know, calmer light of months after the fact 
can analyze whether there was a realistic apprehension of a 
weapon or not. 
If you deem that there was, then there is legal 
sufficiency for maintaining this prosecution as a first-degree 
felony. I'm simply saying that without Mr. Ireland suggesting 
he was going to shoot or cut, that the lifting of the hand was 
not sufficient, under this legislative language, to elevate the 
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matter from a second to a first degree. 
THE COURT: You assume Suniville is law? 
MR. PETERSON: Well, I think Suniville is informative 
law. I'm not going to say it's binding on this court because 
the legislature amended the statute after the Suniville 
decision and broadened the language. I'm not here to deny that 
at all. I'm simply suggesting that a lot of the Suniville 
rationale ought to be brought to bear as we analyze the 
language and the other cases that have come down after the new 
amendment when we talk about the dangers of eroding the first 
and second-degree distinction here. 
THE COURT: Well, if you go to Adams for a minute. 
MR. PETERSON: Right. 
THE COURT: That's a court of appeals decision. 
Adams never mentions Suniville. 
MR. PETERSON: Urn-hum. 
THE COURT: But on facts that are very, very similar, 
in my mind, the court of appeals upheld the conviction that 
Suniville overruled. Do you agree with that? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, I think that that is true. 
I think that the Adams court absolutely relied on the new 
language of the statute with regard to representation in 
deciding to distinguish the facts of the Adams case from the 
Suniville case. But what I do also think that is critical 
about Adams for the court to analyze is the verbal component 
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where the defendant in that case, in addition to having the 
bulge in the pocket, said that he would shoot the Taco Bell 
clerk he was robbing. 
THE COURT: Anything further? 
MR. PETERSON: No. Thank you, Judge. 
MR. BOWN: Just briefly, your Honor. My memo 
basically, is still, down to a few words is, to just read the 
statute. The statute we're talking about is 76-1-601(5) which 
talks about what is a dangerous weapon, and that is referred to 
in the aggravated robbery statute. 
And there aren't very many people, I guess, who were 
around when Suniville came down, but that was my case. I 
remember it very vividly. I recall there was a huge outcry 
after that decision came down and the legislature did, in the 
very next session, amend it to this very broad language in 
76-1-601, saying that, "dangerous weapon" means any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury -- and I 
think it's not disputed that a firearm would fit in that 
category -- or a facsimile or representation of the item. 
In Suniville it was a prior statute, and I have it 
in my memo that it was, the statute was simply used a deadly 
weapon or a facsimile -- that's all it says --of that weapon. 
Basically, the way we looked at the Suniville case 
was that when you point a gun you've got to do a photocopy of a 
gun and show it to them in order to have it under that 
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rationale. 
So the end result is that the legislature broadened 
the definition of dangerous weapon and in effect told the 
supreme court we exactly mean that, that if it's a verbal 
representation; if it's a non-verbal representation such as 
gesturing with a hand in the coat or in a pocket, that's 
enough. And if you look at the statute itself it says that if 
there is not --if you don't have the item capable of causing 
death or serious bodily injury, a facsimile or representation 
of the item. "Representation" means -- I looked in the 
dictionary for what "representation" meant and several things 
come out. It means to serve as a sign or symbol of; to serve 
as the counterpart or image of; to take the place of in some 
respect; state in a manner intended to effect action or 
judgment; to serve as a specimen, example, or instance of; to 
form an image or a representation of in the mind; to correspond 
to in essence. 
All that means that it is in the statute. If 
someone represents, by verbal or non-verbal conduct, that they 
have a weapon, that's enough. 
And it says in (5)(b)(i) that the actor's use or 
apparent intended use -- very broad, very low standard --of 
the item, and that means is there something that would give 
basis to someone to believe that the item is a firearm, in this 
case. And that apparent intended use leads the victim to 
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reasonably believe the item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury. 
And I submit that's exactly what we have in this 
case, that the victim had -- did not speculate because 
speculation based on facts is not speculation. It is a belief. 
It is not speculation at all. It is -- thatfs what the witness 
testified to, that he believed, I would submit, reasonably 
believed based on what he saw, that the gesturing by the 
defendant caused him to do things that he would not have done 
otherwise. It was all reasonable. 
An apparent intended use is not -- intentionally, we 
don't get into his intent. Just his apparent intended use. 
In (b)(ii) it says or the actor --or the actor 
represents to the victim verbally or in any other manner. 
There are a couple of things that were interesting 
that I saw, and that is in Rule 801 of the Rules of Evidence it 
defines a statement. This is just before hearsay. And it 
defines a statement: Statement is an oral or written assertion 
or nonverbal conduct of a person. So a statement is nonverbal 
conduct or an oral or written assertion if that nonverbal 
conduct is intended by the person as an assertion. 
In the definition 76-1-601 an act means voluntary 
bodily movement and it includes speech. Act and statement seem 
to be almost the same. And I would submit that what the 
legislature intended was that if the defendant -- if a person 
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who robs somebody says he has a gun, that's enough. If he 
indicates in any other matter that he has a gun, that's enough 
to make it an aggravated robbery. And the subjective part is 
if the apparent intended use leaves the victim to reasonably 
believe that he has one, has a gun, that's enough. 
Very broad statute, and I submit that under the 
facts of this case, that contemporaneous with the demand for 
money, we have a gesture which is reasonably interpreted by the 
clerk that he may or may not have a gun, but he does things 
because -- that he would not have done otherwise because of 
that gesture. And I submit, based on all that, that the 
legislature intends that the facts of this case be charged and 
constitute the offense of aggravated robbery, first-degree 
felony. 
THE COURT: This statute was amended in 1989, 
correct? Or close to it? 
MR. BOWN: Close to it. I know Suniville came out 
and it was just right after that that the legislature amended 
the statute. 
THE COURT: Well, I have done a search in this area 
and I don't pretend it to be exhaustive, but every subsequent 
case indicates there has got to be something more than a bulge 
in a pocket, that I can read. And every other case takes the 
definition, and if there has been a conviction upheld it's 
because of some corroborating statement: I have a gun. I have 
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a knife. I111 use this. 
Even Suniville, I think, wouldn't stand up today, 
with this new definition. 
MR. BOWN: I think it would. 
THE COURT: You think Suniville --
MR. BOWN: Yes. He had the finger and he was saying 
I'll blow you away. 
THE COURT: I mean the holding in Suniville. 
MR. BOWN: Holding. Excuse me. Yes. I thought you 
meant the facts, and I believe you're right. 
THE COURT: So I have something here and -- but I'm 
troubled by two things. One, I don't think that employees or 
anybody else should have to second-guess what is going on in an 
accused's mind when they put their hand in their pocket. 
Obviously, something is intended. If nothing were intended in 
this case, you walk in and say -- hands in view, whatever --
give me your money. But as soon as somebody starts to hold 
their weapon in their hand in a manner which to most of us 
would indicate -- certainly would indicate to me that there was 
a weapon involved the way the hand is being held, the way the 
command is made to get money. I think all of us, or most 
people, would be alarmed, and I think it's unfair to put the 
burden upon a victim in that case and say, well, show me what's 
there, at the risk of being blown away or stabbed or hit or 
hurt. 
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On the other hand, that may be a baseball, golf 
ball, nothing. And in this case apparently no weapon was ever 
found. That doesn't necessarily mean one wasn't used at the 
time. 
But, Mr. Bown, what does "represent" mean? The term 
11
 representation" ? 
MR. BOWN: That's the question I had, too, your 
Honor. To represent is to make it known to other persons, 
something like a gun. 
THE COURT: Well, I think you've met the statute 
where it says the actor's use or apparent intended use of the 
item leads the victim to reasonably believe that the item is 
likely to cause death or serious injury. Number two doesn't 
apply, that the actor didn't represent verbally -- well, maybe 
he did when it says any other manner he's in control of an 
item. But those are predicate to the facsimile or 
representation. That's why I ask what "representation" means. 
MR. BOWN: Well, it's not an identical thing because 
that's a facsimile. But "representation" is something that is 
a sign or a symbol of, or a form, or image, or representation 
of something that in the mind of someone corresponds to an 
incidence. And I would submit that a hand, an arm -- let me 
put it this way. An unseen hand in a coat pocket, especially 
when it's in a gesturing mode, is in fact a representation, 
nonverbal representation, I have a gun. And he could have had 
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his hand in his pocket like this, like Napoleon in his 
pictures. I don't believe that would be an indication that he 
has a gun. Or if he has his hands in his pockets and they're 
down loose, not pointing at anything, I don't think that's a 
representation of anything. 
When it is up with an arm at almost a 90-degree 
angle or near there, that's a indication, that's a 
representation that there is a gun. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
Mr. Peterson, I'll give you the last word if you 
want. 
MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
Your Honor, I appreciate the Court's inquiry and 
sensitivity to the fine distinctions that we're drawing here. 
The reason I don't think the representation element 
is met in this case is partly the fact sensitivity of the time 
of year. If this were the middle of July and someone is in 
there with a ski parka, with a hand in his pocket you might 
have more apprehension than you would in the dead of winter, 
particularly the tough winter that we had here in December. 
Somebody comes in with a parka on, with their hands --at least 
one hand, maybe two hands, huddled up inside their coat. I 
don't know about your Honor, but many times when I have my ski 
jacket, or other jacket, I put my hands up in the coat and I 
put my hands up at that very right angle Mr. Bown just 
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indicated. And that is not an unreasonable position, or 
gesturing, for that particular time of year, particularly when 
you're coming in directly from a cold street, which we have at 
the Gateway Mall, into a store. 
So I'm just suggesting that under the cases that 
have been decided after the legislative amendment that there 
needs to be at least some additional language used by 
Mr. Ireland or the showing of something out of that pocket for 
there to be a distinction between a first and second-degree 
robbery. 
THE COURT: All right. I will let you know within 
two weeks, probably or hopefully shorter than that. 
Once I have issued my decision, what is the intent 
of the parties? 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honorjr if the Court decides in 
the State's favor here, I have already executed a Sery plea 
form that everybody has analyzed and is prepared to sign. If 
the Court rules in our favor that the elements here are only 
sufficient for a second-degree robbery, I will rewrite the plea 
form and Mr. Ireland will plead to the second-degree robbery. 
And in that regard, Judge -- I know it doesn't go to 
the merits of your decision -- I just want everyone to know 
Mr. Ireland's intent has been to resolve this case and plead 
this case out rather than try it. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
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Anything further, Mr. Bown? 
MR. BOWN: No, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, either way I go, whoever 
prevails here will prepare the Findings of Fact and Order for 
your Honor's signature. In that regard I'm wondering whether 
it would benefit the Court if I provided you a copy of the 
transcript. 
THE COURT: If you would like to, that's fine. 
MR. PETERSON: As you analyze your decision situation 
here. In that case, I just ask that we have an expedited copy 
of the transcript, if possible. 
THE COURT: Are you paying for that? 
MR. PETERSON: Yes. 
THE COURT: Fine with me. Thank you. 
THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, your Honor. 
MR. BOWN: Are we going to have a review date? 
THE COURT: We'll set it -- if today is the 17th --
on the 29th at 8:30. 
MR. PETERSON: And you want Mr. Ireland brought up at 
that point, correct? 
THE COURT: That will be fine. 
MR. PETERSON: Your Honor, is that your regular 
Monday law and motion? 
THE COURT: Yes. 
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MR. PETERSON: Thank you, Judge. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Proceedings in the above-entitled matter were 
concluded.) 
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Addendum B 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 031908349 
vs. : 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter was brought before the Court by Motion on March 
17, 2004. The State has brought aggravated robbery charges against 
defendant William Joseph Ireland, pursuant to Section 76-6-302, 
Utah Code Ann. Mr. Ireland has waived his right to a jury trial, 
and intends to enter a guilty plea. The sole issue before the 
Court is whether Mr. Ireland is guilty of a first or second degree 
felony. Mr. Ireland is prepared to admit that on December 6, 2 003, 
he entered Fortier Jewelers located in the Gateway Mall at 11 S. 
Rio Grande Street, and demanded jewelry and money from a store 
employee. 
The testimony of the employee/witness established that the 
defendant entered the store with his right hand in his coat pocket. 
The coat was described as large and puffy, perhaps a parka. The 
defendant's hand was held close to his right side, with the elbow 
extending toward the back or behind the defendant. While the 
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defendant's hand was in this position, he told the witness, "I want 
you to go and get me all the money in the cash drawer right now." 
The witness described the defendant's action as: "There was one 
hand in a pocket, gesturing like there was a gun." (Hearing Tr. p. 
11.) The witness also described the defendant's hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket as "pointing at me." (Hearing Tr. p. 11.) 
He further described the defendant's hand as "it was definitely 
gesturing like there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
(Hearing Tr. p. 12.) The witness then testified that he thought 
the defendant had a weapon based on the motioning of the 
defendant's hand in the defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. p. 
13.) 
The witness admitted he did not know whether the defendant had 
a gun and that he never saw a gun, but assumed the defendant had a 
gun because of the gesturing of the defendant's hand in the 
defendant's coat pocket. (Hearing Tr. at p. 16.) Additionally, 
the bulge in the defendant's pocket, and the way it looked, pointed 
at the witness led the witness to believe the defendant had a 
weapon. (Hearing Tr. at p. 2 7.) At the time of the robbery, the 
witness felt that the defendant may have had a weapon in his hand, 
and the witness testified that he was afraid that he might be shot 
if he did not comply with the defendant's request. (Hearing Tr. at 
p. 2 7.) It was the witness's further impression that the defendant 
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intended to make the witness believe that the defendant had a gun 
in his pocket; and he did so believe. (Hearing Tr. at p.28.) 
The issue before the Court is whether a nonverbal gesture 
constitutes a "representation" of a dangerous weapon pursuant to 
Section 76-1-601, Utah Code Ann. This issue appears to be one of 
first impression in the state of Utah. 
In State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 (Utah 1987), the Utah 
Supreme Court overturned an aggravated robbery conviction based on 
a prior statute where the defendant had stated, "This is a robbery, 
don't turn it into a homicide. Give me all of your money." Id- at 
962. The defendant approached the teller with his right hand 
inside of his coat pocket, which he lifted over the counter. The 
witness testified that, "something was pointing at me in his 
pocket." .Id. at 962. Based upon those facts and the statute in 
effect at the time, the Supreme Court stated that the defendant had 
not used a firearm, or a facsimile of a firearm, or a deadly 
weapon. Id. at 965 (relying on Utah Code Ann., Section 76-6-302 
(1975), which stated that " [a] person commits aggravated robbery if 
in the course of committing robbery, he: (a) uses a firearm or a 
facsimile of a firearm...or a deadly weapon...."). 
In apparent response to the Suniville decision, the 
legislature amended Section 76-6-302, Utah Code Ann., which reads 
in pertinent part: 
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(1) A person commits aggravated robbery if in 
the course of committing robbery, he: 
(a) uses or threatens to use a dangerous 
weapon.... 
Section 76-1-601, defines "dangerous weapon" as: 
(a) any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury; or 
(b) a facsimile or representation of the 
item; and: 
(i) the actor's use or apparent 
intended use of the item leads the victim to 
reasonably believe the item is likely to cause 
death or serious bodily injury; or 
(ii) The actor represents to the 
victim verbally or in any other manner that he 
is in control of such an item. 
A review of the case law in this state since Suniville 
indicates that convictions of defendants have been upheld where a 
defendant made a verbal representation that he or she has a gun or 
will use a gun or a weapon and the statement is accompanied with a 
show of an apparent weapon, that is, a hand in a pocket. See, 
e.g., State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 310 (Utah App. 1992). This Court 
must decide whether a representation may be made by a hand and 
gestures of the hand absent a verbal representation. This Court 
concludes that the elements of the crime alleged in this case have 
been met by the defendant's gestures as set forth above. 
In the case before the Court, the witness clearly indicated he 
felt the defendant had a weapon. As the Court indicated during the 
course of the hearing, it is not fair, reasonable or wise to place 
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the burden upon a witness to inquire whether or not a bulge in the 
defendant's pocket is or is not a weapon. 
It defies logic to allow a defendant to induce a victim to 
believe the defendant has a weapon and thereby coerce a victim to 
perform some act based on the defendant's representations and then 
allow the defendant to benefit when it is later shown the defendant 
in fact had no such weapon. The Court finds in this case that the 
defendant's placement of his hand in his pocket and the gesturing 
accompanying it, as testified to by the witness, constituted a 
representation. Therefore, the State is within its discretion in 
charging this matter as a first degree felony. 
Although the statutory language governing aggravated robbery 
seems to clearly encompass the defendant's actions, this Court is 
further persuaded that the defendant can be charged with aggravated 
robbery by the case law of other states interpreting statutes 
similar to ours. Whether a weapon or a facsimile is actually 
displayed in the commission of a crime, or a verbal representation 
that such a weapon is in the possession of the perpetrator, or 
whether the representation is made by menacing gestures, the effect 
is the same on the victim. A facsimile of a gun can cause no more 
harm than leading one to believe the perpetrator actually has a 
gun, whether by word or action. The Utah statute is similar to 
that found in New York. New York's law reads: 
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A person is guilty of robbery in the second 
degree if he forcibly steals property and if, 
in the course of the commission of the crime 
he "[displays] what appears to be a pistol, 
revolver, rifle, shotgun, machine gun, or 
other firearm." 
N.Y. Penal Law § 160.10(2) (b) , as quoted in People v. Knowles, 436 
N.Y.S.2d 25 (Sup. Ct. 1981). The Supreme Court appellate division 
of New York held in Knowles: 
We hold today that if a person who is in fact 
unarmed commits a robbery and, in the course 
thereof, positions his hand in his pocket in a 
manner that is intended to convey to his 
victim the impression that he is holding a 
firearm, that said person has committed 
robbery in the second degree within the 
meaning of the statute quoted above. 
436 N.Y.2d at 25. 
Delaware's statute is also similar to Utah's, and in State v. 
Lawrence, 2001 Del. Super. Lexis 318 (Del. Super. Ct. Aug. 28, 
2001), aff'd, 790 A.2d 476 (Del. 2002), held that the term 
"displays" included a defendant's act of wrapping a cloth around 
his hand so that it appeared to hide a gun, and where the victim 
reasonably felt- that the defendant was armed. 
The facts of this case are very similar to Deleon v. Arkansas, 
1989 Ark. App., Lexis 608 (1999) , which interpreted another statute 
much like Utah's. In Deleon, the defendant entered a convenience 
store to purchase a pack of cigarettes, and stated to the clerk, 
"Would you mind filling me up a sack?" JEd. at *2. As the clerk 
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reached for a bag, he noticed that the man had his hand in his 
pocket. Id. The clerk testified, "I figured he had a weapon in his 
pocket or a gun." Id. The Court of Appeals of Arkansas stated 
that when the defendant put his hand in his pocket, he did so "for 
the purpose of inducing the belief that he was armed with a deadly 
weapon and that although he used no threatening words [as to the 
use of a weapon] , his conduct had the desired effect upon the 
victim," who perceived the defendant's actions to be menacing or 
threatening. I_d. at *4. 
This Court believes that the reasoning of these cases is sound 
and consistent with the terms of Utah's revised statute, and 
concludes that "representation" includes not only words, but 
threatening gestures and movements which would indicate the 
defendant is in possession of a dangerous weapon. 
The State's filing of this action as a first degree felony is 
upheld. 
i /N 
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